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The average nominal prices of common stocks traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange have remained constant at approximately $30-$40 per share since the Great 
Depression as a result of stock splits. It is surprising that U. S. firms actively 
maintained constant nominal prices for their shares while general prices in the 
economy went up more than tenfold. This is especially puzzling given that 
commissions paid by investors on trading ten $30 shares are about ten times those 
paid on a single $300 share. I review potential explanations including signaling and 
optimal trading ranges and find that none of the existing theories are able to explain 
the observed constant nominal prices. I suggest that the evidence is consistent with 
the idea that customs and norms can explain the nominal price puzzle. 
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Introduction 
Evolution generally results in organisms that seem well adapted to their 
environment. However, many animals have vestigial structures that once served a 
purpose but no longer do, such as the human appendix. Societies and cultures show 
strong evidence of norms, a societal analog of an evolutionarily inherited trait. For 
example, people in the UK and many of its ex-colonies drive on the left hand side of 
the road, and the Mursi people of southern Ethiopia, among many others, insert 
plates into their lips because of a longstanding norm about beauty (Turton (2004)). 
These are two examples of norms, which despite arising from historical accident, still 
serve their cultures well. Many societal customs appear to be vestigial remnants from 
earlier generations as well. For example, the tradition of wearing neckties began in the 
sixteenth century when men donned linen cravats, which served the sensible purpose 
of a bib or napkin. Although silk neckties still collect stains, they no longer serve any 
practical function. 
The question I investigate in this paper is whether vestigial norms and customs 
affect corporate decision making. Consider the following fact: The average nominal 
price for a share of stock on the New York Stock exchange has remained roughly 
constant (about $30-$40) since the Great Depression. The mechanism that has 
allowed share prices to remain remarkably constant for over 70 years is stock splits. 
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For example, in Table 1, I report the average prices of six well know securities for 
each decade starting in 1935 until 2005. 
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Table 1: Selected Prices and Splits on the NYSE, 1933 to 20051 
Panel A: Average Price 
Sample Years  ADM ED GE GM HSY UVV 
1933-1935 $32.58 $34.68 $22.80 $32.43 $63.50 $17.99 
1936-1945 $36.80 $26.44 $38.23 $51.16 $59.37 $11.05 
1946-1955 $39.54 $33.48 $51.86 $66.96 $46.69 $26.79 
1956-1965 $37.73 $65.41 $76.41 $58.90 $66.60 $37.07 
1966-1975 $39.42 $25.58 $75.32 $70.46 $22.95 $21.26 
1976-1985 $21.32 $25.13 $58.43 $60.96 $31.08 $20.79 
1986-1995 $23.39 $34.10 $67.57 $53.49 $40.94 $37.96 
1996-2005 $16.43 $39.32 $62.14 $53.64 $61.91 $27.28 
Average $30.74 $35.60 $59.84 $58.26 $47.75 $25.70 
 
Panel B: Average UnSplit Price 
Sample Years  ADM ED GE GM HSY UVV 
1933-1935 $32.58 $34.68 $22.80 $32.43 $63.50 $17.99 
1936-1945 $40.15 $26.44 $38.23 $51.16 $59.37 $11.05 
1946-1955 $118.62 $33.48 $69.68 $111.96 $114.78 $29.66 
1956-1965 $113.18 $69.89 $229.22 $353.41 $384.33 $83.85 
1966-1975 $299.82 $51.16 $302.33 $422.75 $358.13 $85.03 
1976-1985 $1,300.40 $69.43 $439.58 $365.79 $631.65 $83.15 
1986-1995 $5,879.48 $211.60 $1,738.45 $500.29 $3,580.41 $174.15 
1996-2005 $10,157.04 $314.54 $9,630.20 $643.63 $13,003.05 $218.25 
Cumulative Split 679 : 1 8 : 1 288 : 1 12 : 1 375 : 1 8 : 1 
  
                                                     
1 Data is from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I select six well-known companies 
that have survived from 1933 to the present as representative examples. Over each time period, I 
calculate the average month end closing price (Panel A) and the average of what would have been 
the month end closing price if the firm had never issued any stock splits or stock dividends (Panel 
B). Cumulative Split is the magnitude of the accumulated stock splits and stock dividends 
undertaken by the company from January 1933 to December 2005. ADM is Archers Daniel Midland 
Co., ED is Consolidated Edison, Inc, GE is General Electric, GM is General Motors, HSY is The 
Hershey Company, and UVV is the ticker symbol for Allegheny Energy Inc. 
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However, the existence of stock splits is merely a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for nominal process to remain stable. In fact, stock splits could have been 
used to create almost any time series of nominal prices. Research on stock splits has 
proposed some theoretical explanations of why managers may choose to split their 
stock, but these proposed models fail to predict that nominal share prices would 
remain constant.2  
To illustrate the phenomenon, consider the case of General Electric (GE). On 
December 31, 1935, GE was trading at $38.25 a share and exactly 72 years later, it was 
trading at $37.07 a share. Had GE never split its shares from 1933 to 2007, its share 
price on December 31, 2007, would have been $10,676.16. In fact, it has split its stock 
seven times over this time period, resulting in a cumulative split of 288:1, and each 
targeted price was about the same. GE, like most firms, is pro-active at keeping its 
nominal share price constant by splitting its shares. I argue that in so doing, GE and 
most other U.S. firms follow a norm that keeps their nominal share prices in a narrow 
and roughly constant range through time. 
                                                     
2 I focus on the role of stock splits in setting prices, rather than cash dividends or other corporate 
actions, because a stock split is, at least on a first order approximation, strictly cosmetic– nothing 
fundamental about the firm changes. The firm does not reduce its cash balance or retained earnings 
as they would in a cash dividend, no money is transferred from the firm to investors. Investors 
merely trade one share of old stock in exchange for, say, two new shares, each of which represents 
an economic right in the firm that is exactly one half of the right of their old share. 
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Furthermore, while it may have made sense to maintain share prices in this 
range for some time period, it is difficult to think of a rationale that could support a 
constant share price as being optimal over the past seventy two years.  
Adhering to the norm and actively maintaining nominal stock prices in a 
narrow band through stock splits is costly. Based on discussions with lawyers and 
bankers who have been involved in these transactions I estimate the direct 
administrative costs of splits currently to be in the range of $250,000 to $800,000 for a 
large firm, which is similar to the estimate offered by Ryser (1996). Sosnick (1961) 
provides a cost estimate for the earlier part of my sample. He estimates dollar costs as 
a function of the payout ratio on a stock distribution, and reports costs of $250,000 
for a 2 percent distribution, $330,000 for a 5 percent distribution, $2,600,000 for a 200 
percent distribution, and $6,300,000 for a 500 percent distribution.  
However, this direct cost is dwarfed by the costs imposed on shareholders. 
First, the relative bid-ask spread increases after splits (Copeland, 1979; Conroy, Harris, 
and Benet, 1990; Kadapakkam, Krishnamurthy, and Tse, 2005), which increases 
trading costs for all investors. (The relative bid-ask spread is defined as the posted bid 
price, less the posted ask price, scaled by the bid-ask midpoint, and is a measure of 
cost of trading a stock for investors.) Second, institutional investors (at least since the 
mid-1970s) tend to pay a fixed brokerage commission per share, regardless of share 
price. (I use the term institutional investor to describe professional money managers, 
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as opposed to retail investors.) Thus, trading 288 shares of GE at $37.07 would be 
significantly more expensive than trading a single share at $10,676.16. Had GE never 
split its stock (and everything else had remained the same), investors could have saved 
more than 99 percent of their brokerage commissions—which would save those 
trading GE stock about $100 million a year in commissions.3 Third, the New York 
Stock Exchange charges a per-share fee to companies listed on its exchange, so this 
fee increases after a split. 
Given the negative economic consequences for investors, why do firms pro-
actively keep their share prices in a nominally constant narrow band? I suggest norms 
as a potential explanation. The role of norms in economics has been established as a 
mechanism to coordinate actions in settings where there are multiple equilibria 
(Wärneryd (1994)). “Social norms are customary rules of behavior that coordinate our 
interactions with others… (a norm) continues in force because we prefer to conform 
to the rule given the expectation that others are going to conform.” (Young (2008)). 
My investigation points to a specific norm about nominal share prices, and how it has 
continued in force long after any possible benefit of coordination on this specific 
equilibrium has dissipated. 
                                                     
3 The number in the text is based on a cost estimate of 2 cents/share, which I believe to be 
conservative. In discussions with several large and active money managers, I have been told that 
commissions are typically between 3 and 5 cents per share. The total cost estimate is also 
conservative by a factor of two, as each trade involves a buyer and seller. In essence, I am assuming 
that each trade is a trade with the market maker, and none of the trades are driven by institutions on 
both the buy and sell side, each of which would have to pay the commission. 
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In the next section I describe facts and patterns relevant to constant share 
prices, as any satisfactory explanation for the nominal share price puzzle should be 
consistent with all these facts. Next, I discuss whether economic hypotheses about 
optimal trading-ranges or about signaling can explain why share prices are nominally 
constant. I then explain some of the implications of norms on optimal price ranges 
and describe some possible reasons why the average price norm was set to $30 a 
share.  
Facts and Patterns 
1. U.S. share prices have remained constant since the Great Depression. 
Figure 1, Panel A displays the annual average share price of every stock from 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
from 1933 through 2007. The equally weighted average of share prices remained close 
to $25 throughout the entire period. While the value-weighted price is higher, with a 
mean of $36.56, the overall pattern is similar, suggesting that the results are not driven 
by just a few large stocks. As a reference, the Consumer Price Index experienced a 
geometric average annual inflation of 3.5 percent over this time, for a cumulative 
increase of 1,528 percent. Therefore, maintaining constant nominal prices resulted in 
a dramatic decrease in real prices. Figure 1, Panel B illustrates that real share prices 
have declined by more than 90 percent over this period. The equivalent, in today’s 
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dollars, of average stock prices from the 1930s and 1940s is a price per share of 
around $450! Not only do the mean and median nominal prices remain constant, but 
there is also no trend in the cross-sectional variability of share prices, which has 
remained roughly constant over the last 72 years, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1: Average Prices of Securities on the NYSE and AMEX, 1933 to 20074 
 
 
                                                     
4 Data is from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). These figures show the time series 
of value-weighted averages and equal-weighted averages of security prices. Data includes all ordinary 
common shares that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange, 
but excludes Berkshire Hathaway. If Berkshire Hathaway is retained in the sample, the results are 
quantitatively similar for the value-weighted average price but significantly higher for the equal-
weighted average price post-1996. Nominal averages are calculated without adjustment. Real 
averages are presented in 1933 dollars, using monthly inflation data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Consumer Price Index for “All Urban Consumers, U.S.” 
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Table 2: Summary of Prices, Returns, and Splits on the NYSE and AMEX.5 
10 Years 
Ending VW Price 
EW 
Price VWReturn EWReturn 
# of 
Splits Split Size 
1935 $41.59 $41.16 14.89% 8.30% 390 1.59 : 1 
1945 $30.63 $25.74 14.01% 17.65% 150 1.93 : 1 
1955 $40.30 $31.45 18.15% 13.04% 823 1.65 : 1 
1965 $47.56 $34.15 14.85% 12.86% 2,121 1.42 : 1 
1975 $37.07 $23.43 9.45% 4.99% 2,932 1.43 : 1 
1985 $31.00 $20.28 22.40% 24.65% 3,038 1.53 : 1 
1995 $34.15 $22.11 20.29% 12.39% 2,209 1.56 : 1 
2005 $36.03 $25.10 20.25% 14.74% 1,938 1.64 : 1 
Average $37.29 $27.93   170 1.53: 1 
  
                                                     
5 Data is from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and includes all ordinary common 
shares (SHRCD=10, 11, 12) that are listed on the NYSE and AMEX exchanges (EXCHCD= 1, 2, 
31, 32), but excludes Berkshire Hathaway (PERMNO=17778, 83443).  For each 10 year period, I 
calculate the VW Price and the EW Price as the time series average of the monthly VW and EW 
prices respectively.  The number of splits represents the sum of all stock splits and stock dividends 
(DISTCD=5523, 5532, 5533, 5543, 5552, 5553).  If a firm makes multiple stock distributions in one 
month, I count this as a single stock distribution.  The split size is the average of (1+FACSHR), and 
represents the number of shares one would hold at the end of the distribution. If Berkshire 
Hathaway is retained in the sample, the results are quantitatively similar for VW Price but 
significantly higher for EW Price post 1996.  Returns are reported as the geometric annual average 
return over the sample period, Average Splits is an annual average number of splits, and Split Size is 
the implied average annual split ratio. 
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Table 3 Price and Split Distributions by Returns.6 
Return Decile Pricet=0 GCRETX E[Pricet=T] Split  Pricet=T 
1 $15.38 -21% $4.86 1.21 : 1 $4.00 
2 $17.75 -9% $10.80 1.15 : 1 $9.38 
3 $19.50 -4% $15.60 1.16 : 1 $13.50 
4 $18.88 -1% $17.98 1.15 : 1 $15.63 
5 $19.75 2% $21.72 1.17 : 1 $18.50 
6 $21.13 5% $27.25 1.21 : 1 $22.50 
7 $20.44 9% $31.29 1.32 : 1 $23.63 
8 $20.25 13% $37.69 1.42 : 1 $26.63 
9 $18.75 19% $45.08 1.60 : 1 $28.25 
10 $14.50 31% $55.61 1.80 : 1 $30.88 
  
                                                     
6 Data is from CRSP as described above. I divide the data into non-overlapping five year intervals 
from 1930 to 2004. For each of these 15 sub-samples, I rank the securities into deciles based on 
their cumulative return excluding dividends (“CRETX”) over the sub-sample period. For each 
decile, I obtain the median price at the beginning of the sub-sample (“Pricet=0”), the median 
CRETX, and the median price at the end of the sample (“Pricet=T”).  “Split” is the implied split ratio 
for firms in each decile that generates the difference between the expected price at the end of the 
period (“E[Pricet=T]”), defined by Pricet=0*CRETX and the actual price at the end of the period 
Pricet=T. I report the time series average of the results by decile below. The results using means, 
instead of medians, is quantitatively similar to the reported results. 
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Figure 2: Relative Variability in Prices, 1933 to 2005.7 
 
  
                                                     
7 This chart depicts the monthly coefficient of variation of stock prices and a non-parametric 
estimator that also measures the variability of stock prices. 
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2. Larger firms tend to have higher share prices.  
Figure 3 shows that large firms have had consistently higher share prices than 
small firms. For example, NYSE and AMEX firms in the top quintile of market 
capitalization tend to trade around $50 a share. In contrast, firms in the bottom 
quintile tend to trade below $10 a share. These findings imply that as firms “graduate” 
from one size group to the other--primarily through a combination of firm growth 
and accompanying share price appreciation--they adapt to the norms of their new 
peers and choose a new higher trading range for their shares. The correlation of firm 
size and share price is neither mechanical nor a result of listing requirements: all of the 
large firms could have selected different split ratios and achieved a low price per 
share. 
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Figure 3: Nominal NYSE and AMEX Equal Weighed Average Price by Size 
Quintile8 
 
  
                                                     
8 The figure presents the twelve month average of equal weighted security prices by quintile. Quintile 
1 are small firms, and have the lowest average prices, Quintile 5 are the largest firms, and have the 
highest average stock prices, and the relationship of average price and size is monotonic. The results 
are robust to size deciles. 
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3. Initial public offering share prices have remained constant.  
I find a pattern in the setting of new issue prices that is remarkably consistent 
with what I found for equity pricing in general. Initial public offerings have been 
issued at approximately the same share price since the Great Depression. Data on 
initial public offerings going back to 1976 (Figure 4, Panel A) shows that the offering 
price per share has remained in the $15-20 range for the past 30 years. I also use the 
first appearance in the data collected by the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) at the University of Chicago as a proxy for initial public offerings to extend 
the time series back to 1933 (Figure 4, Panel B). Again, the same picture emerges: if 
anything, prices of shares in initial public offerings were marginally higher in the 
1950s, but have remained in a tight band since 1933.9 While share prices for initial 
public offerings are significantly lower than the average equal-weighted price of $25, 
this is consistent with the size and price regularity described above. As shown in Table 
4, Firms undertaking initial public offerings are smaller than the average listed firm, 
and their prices are consistent with the average share price of similar-size firms. 
  
                                                     
9 I also investigated the time series of IPO prices using the IPO data from Gompers and Lerner 
(2003). The results are quantitatively similar to those of the CRSP first appearance proxy. I thank 
Paul Gompers for his generosity in providing us with the data. 
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Figure 4: Nominal Value-Weighted and Equal-Weighted Average IPO and 
Newly Listed Prices of securities listed on the NYSE and AMEX, 1976 to 200510 
 
  
                                                     
10 Data is from SDC.  I select those securities that are (i) IPOs (IPO Flag=Yes), (ii) Common Shares, 
(iii) Have an offer price greater than $4.99, and whose primary exchange is the NYSE or the AMEX. 
There are few (<20) observations prior to 1983, so I caution against relying on the early part of the 
time series. To construct a longer time series that should approximate IPO pricing, I define “first 
appearance on CRSP” as a proxy for IPO, and take the month end price of the securities for this 
figure. I recognize that it is a noisy proxy for IPO pricing as it includes securities that “graduate” 
from other exchanges to the NYSE and AMEX. Excluding 1962 (the year that the AMEX enters 
the CRSP data) I have an average of 94 “first appearances” per year over the 1933 to 2005 period. 
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Table 4: Summary of Initial Listings by Size Quintiles and Date11 
Panel A: Distribution of New Listings by Size Quintile 
Sample Years  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
1933-1935 18.7% 19.3% 21.2% 21.6% 19.2% 
1936-1945 6.4% 30.1% 38.6% 18.6% 6.4% 
1946-1955 10.6% 28.0% 23.4% 24.8% 13.1% 
1956-1965 32.3% 31.8% 21.5% 9.8% 4.6% 
1966-1975 16.0% 33.4% 26.4% 17.4% 6.7% 
1976-1985 21.3% 34.5% 22.7% 14.0% 7.4% 
1986-1995 21.1% 25.8% 28.4% 19.1% 5.6% 
1996-2005 27.1% 25.8% 23.6% 16.2% 7.2% 
Average 22.5% 28.5% 24.8% 16.5% 7.7% 
 
Panel B: Average Price of New Distributions by Size Quintile 
Sample Years  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
1933-1935 $1.52 $5.22 $10.10 $18.13 $30.81 
1936-1945 $13.98 $18.66 $26.27 $30.95 $42.61 
1946-1955 $14.11 $21.49 $21.22 $28.99 $36.93 
1956-1965 $7.39 $15.23 $23.10 $33.10 $45.35 
1966-1975 $11.89 $17.27 $23.35 $32.20 $45.79 
1976-1985 $7.85 $12.89 $17.19 $23.89 $0.00 
1986-1995 $6.49 $11.25 $17.83 $24.92 $30.33 
1996-2005 $6.63 $13.53 $23.03 $32.49 $35.70 
Average $7.29 $13.97 $20.46 $28.12 $36.69 
 
  
                                                     
11 Data is from CRSP as described above, except I exclude the year 1963 from this analysis as this is the first year the 
AMEX appears on the CRSP tape. I determine the size quintile to which each new listing on CRSP belongs, and report 
the results in 10 year sub-samples. Panel A shows the percentage of new listings by each quintile in each sub-sample. The 
overall average is an equal weighted average. Panel B shows newly listed prices by size quintile. Again, the overall 
averages are equal weighted averages. The average new listing price across the entire sample is $18.15. 
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4. Share prices of open-end mutual funds have remained roughly constant since the 1960s. 
An investor who wants to invest in the shares of a mutual fund can send the 
money to the fund company and the fund will sell fractional shares in the mutual fund 
(calculated to three decimal places) as necessary. The price of a share in a mutual fund 
is a purely arbitrary number, a true numeraire. Nevertheless, mutual fund companies 
also have splits to keep share prices relatively constant, as seen in Figure 5. 
Using the Mutual Fund Database from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP), I find that from 1961 to 2007 the average open-end mutual fund net 
asset value per share drifted slightly upward. The average price is around $9 per share 
in the first 20 years of the sample and around $13 in the second part of the sample--
about a 50 percent increase. However, this increase is very small when compared to 
cumulative increases in consumer prices of 605 percent and in stock returns of 11,250 
percent over the same time period.  
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Figure 5: Nominal and Real Equal-Weighted Average Net Asset Value per 
Share of Open End Funds, 1961 to 2005.12 
 
  
                                                     
12 Data is from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. To proxy for equity funds, the data is screened to 
exclude those funds with a net asset value per share of less than $5, and those funds that do not 
have a strong correlation with the market. Specifically, I regress each fund’s return (“RETM”) 
against the CRSP Value-Weighted Market Return (‘VWRETD”) and eliminate those funds that have 
an adjusted R-Square of less than 0.25. The BLS CPI is used to set all prices in 1961 dollars. 
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5. The pattern of share prices varies dramatically across countries. 
Consider the experience of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The average nominal 
price for individual shares in Tokyo has fluctuated considerably; it rose from about 
¥300 /share in 1975 to ¥1500 /share in 1990, then dropped to about ¥800-¥1000 
/share for most of the time from 1991 to 2005—although with a brief jump back to 
¥1400 /share in 2001. The main index for the Tokyo stock market, the Nikkei 225, 
has followed a similar pattern, generating a correlation of 0.85 (Figure 6). For 
example, from 1975 to 1990 the Nikkei 225 index increased by 436 percent and the 
average share price increased by a very similar 409 percent. Looking just at the 1980s, 
the Nikkei 225 increased ten-fold in market value, and average price of individual 
shares increased at the same pace--which suggests that large stock splits were rather 
rare in Japan.13 As the Nikkei 225 index declined after 1990, share prices declined as 
well.  
  
                                                     
13  I thank Mr. Yamaguchi from Ibbotson Associates for sharing data and information on the Tokyo 
stock exchange. Greenwood (2008) provides comprehensive coverage of split activity in Japan, and 
documents that prior to 1999, over 95 percent of splits in Japan were in the form of what would be 
called small stock dividends in the United States. 
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Figure 6: Nominal Trade-Weighted Average Price per Share and Benchmark 
Index, Tokyo Stock Exchange14 
 
  
                                                     
14 Data for the international price figures and tables are from the World Stock Exchange Factbook, 
2004 and World Federation of Exchanges Annual Reports. Trade-Weighted average price is 
calculated as the total value of shares traded on the exchange, divided by the total number of shares 
traded on the exchange. The Nikkei 225 Stock Index is reported from 1982 to 2003, and I use the 
Tokyo Stock Price Index for the pre-1982 time period. The Tokyo Stock Price Index is adjusted 
upwards by a factor of 13.5 to make its value in 1982 equivalent to that of the Nikkei 225 Index. For 
consistency of scale in comparisons of the Tokyo, London and New York stock exchanges, I force 
the left hand scale (which indicates the average price per share in local, nominal currency) to be 
comparable to the right hand scale (which indicates the annual index close level). 
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Share prices in the United Kingdom are also not close to constant in nominal 
terms. Since 1981 (the first year of data), nominal share prices increased 
approximately from ₤1.33 per share to over £4 per share in 2000, before falling back 
to ₤2.99 per share by 2005. As in Japan, the average price of a share and the index of 
stock market returns, as measured by the FTSE Index, are highly correlated at 0.79 
(Figure 7). For example, from 1981 to 1998, average share prices rose from ₤1.33 to 
₤4.00, a rise of 200 percent, while the FTSE index rose from 313 to 2,674, a rise of 
750 percent.  
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Figure 7: Nominal Trade-Weighted Average Price per Share and Benchmark 
Index, London Stock Exchange 
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Unlike Japan or the United Kingdom, U.S. share prices remained roughly 
constant over this time period while the index increases dramatically. For example, 
from 1975 to 2005, the Dow Jones Industrial index increased by 1,157 percent, but 
the average nominal share price changed only from $27.00 to $34.98, an increase of 30 
percent (while consumer prices increased by 275 percent). In the United States, 
nominal share prices are only modestly correlated with the stock market index at 0.41; 
that is, in some cases share prices and the overall stock market index rise together, but 
then a number of corporations split their shares and the pattern is broken (Figure 8). 
The difference between the evolution of share prices in the United States as compared 
with the United Kingdom or Japan does not appear to be driven by different levels of 
inflation, as Tokyo nominal average share prices increased at approximately 2.4 times 
the rate of inflation, UK share prices at approximately 70 percent of the inflation rate, 
and U.S. average nominal share prices increased at only 10 percent of the rate of 
inflation.15  
  
                                                     
15 Japan inflation data is from the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication’s 
Statistics Bureau, available at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/index.htm. UK inflation data 
is from the CDKO index, available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/default.asp. 
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Figure 8: Nominal Trade-Weighted Average Price per Share and Benchmark 
Index, New York Stock Exchange 
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Firms in the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom all face a roughly 
similar business climate. Firms in all three countries have the ability through stock 
splits to maintain constant nominal prices—yet only U.S. firms do so. The United 
States is the only country where average share prices have remained essentially 
constant in nominal terms. The international evidence I present suggests that the 
underlying preference for a specific price point in the United States is probably not 
determined by some underlying fundamental economic reason.  
In addition to London and Tokyo, I investigated share prices on 16 
international stock exchanges, and found substantial cross sectional variation in terms 
of average stock price, variation of stock price, and covariation of average price for 
individual stocks and the overall value of the stock exchange index. The data, 
presented in Table 5, are suggestive of the fact that the nominal price fixation is 
primarily a U.S. or North American phenomenon. The NYSE to DJIA correlation is 
the lowest that I was able to estimate, at 0.41, followed by the Toronto Stock 
Exchange, with ρ=0.64. On the other extreme are the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
the Mexican and Italian Stock Exchanges with each having  ρ >0.90. The NYSE also 
has the smallest coefficient of variation over the time series of 0.14, which is less than 
half of the variation on every other exchange (except for Toronto at 0.24). 
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Table 5: Relationship of Nominal Stock Price and Index Returns in 
International Markets 
Exchange Years 
Average 
Price 
(Current 
US$) 
Average 
Nominal 
Price ∆ Index 
∆ 
Nominal 
Price ρ CV 
 Australia  1979-2005 2.23  2.01  9% 5% 0.81  0.33  
 Brussels  1980-2004 23.82  1,033.72  11% 3% (0.21) 0.33  
 Italian  1975-2004 6.16  3,697.67  12% 8% 0.93  0.73  
 Jakarta  1977-2005 0.08  4,169.84  9% -9% (0.32) 0.99  
 JSE (South Africa)  1975-2005 2.91  7.91  16% 8% 0.94  0.61  
 Korea  1975-2005 5.88  7,918.53  27% 6% 0.70  0.97  
 Kuala Lumpur  1975-2005 0.50  2.95  8% -1% 0.44  0.49  
 London  1981-2005 5.45  2.66  10% 3% 0.79  0.30  
 Mexican  1975-2004 1.66  5.60  46% 20% 0.90  1.14  
 NYSE  1975-2005 37.15  34.40  9% 1% 0.41  0.14  
 Philippine  1980-2005 0.02  0.43  9% 14% 0.36  1.08  
 Singapore  1980-2005 0.71  2.19  4% -5% (0.44) 0.43  
 Taiwan  1975-2005 0.80  36.64  10% 1% 0.69  0.67  
 Thailand  1975-2005 0.22  108.25  7% -11% (0.37) 0.82  
 Tokyo  1975-2005 8.33  820.70  6% 4% 0.85  0.43  
 Toronto  1975-2005 12.65  13.20  8% 2% 0.64  0.24  
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6. Maintaining constant prices increases trading costs 
Maintaining constant share prices through stock splits is costly for investors. 
First, as mentioned earlier, institutional investors and many individual investors pay a 
fixed commission per share or per trade. Even if commissions are as low as 2 cents a 
share, the cumulative costs are non-trivial. Second, I find that general trading costs are 
related to price level. I use Hasbrouck’s (2006) data on prices and bid-ask spreads for 
several hundred stocks starting in the 1920s until 2005. This data is generated by 
sampling daily stock data to estimate bid-ask spreads for over 190,000 firm-year 
observations, and allows us to test the relation between prices and the cost of trading, 
defined as the relative bid-ask spread. 
I regress the relative bid-ask spread on price, trading volume, turnover, and 
market capitalization on an annual basis, and report in Table 6 the time series averages 
of the annual coefficients (using what is called the Fama-Macbeth procedure (Fama 
and MacBeth, 1973). I find that higher priced firms have significantly lower relative 
bid-ask-spreads. For example, holding all else constant, a $5 increase in stock price 
from $30 to $35 per share, decreases the relative bid-ask spread by approximately 9 
percent. I also performed a robustness test using a non-parametric specification for 
price, and find quantitatively similar results. Consistent with tests which show that the 
relative bid-ask spread increases after splits, I find more generally that the specific 
price targeted by firms matters, and lower prices impose higher trading costs.  
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Table 6: Prices and Trading Costs over 80 Years16 
Variable Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
deviation 
t-value P 
Intercept 0.0109293 0.0047560 20.55 < 0.0001 
Price -0.000102840 0.000070595 -13.03 < 0.0001 
Volume -9.997666E-8 1.5440817E-7 -5.79 < 0.0001 
Turnover -1.852681E-6 0.000117234 -0.15 0.8820 
Size 1.927482E-10 1.8602275E-9 0.93 0.3569 
 
  
                                                     
16 Data is from Joel Hasbrouck’s website and  CRSP. There are 197,755 firm year observations 
and 80 years of data. I estimate the cost per dollar of trade for each security (“Cost”). Volume is 
the annual sum of the monthly volume (“Volume”). I estimate turnover as the total annual 
volume/monthly average of shares outstanding (“Turnover”). I estimate size as the monthly 
average price times monthly average number of shares outstanding (“Size”). I create dummy 
variables D1, D2, D3, D4 and D5 based on annual quintile ranking of the monthly average 
price of security. I use the Fama–MacBeth (1973) procedure for the two models shown below. I 
exclude Berkshire Hathaway and all stocks traded below $5/share from the analysis, but the 
results are robust to their inclusion. My linear  specification, with results shown in the table, is: 
Cost = a + β1 [Price] + β2 [Volume] + β3 [Turnover] + β4 [Size] + e.  
My nonparametric specification mentioned in the text was:  
Cost = a1 [D1 ] + a2 [D2 ] + a3 [D3 ] + a4 [D4 ] + a5 [D5 ] + β1 [Price] + β2 [Volume] + β3 
[Turnover] + β4 [Size] + e 
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Economic Explanations 
Can this collection of facts about constant nominal stock price over time be 
explained by some standard economic explanation? Since the regularity is a result of 
firms splitting their stocks, I look to the stock split literature for possible explanations. 
A long literature about stock splits stresses three possible explanations for the act of 
splitting a stock: marketability, “pay to play” and signaling. I discuss them in turn. 
1. The Marketability Hypothesis 
One explanation for stock splits is that they are undertaken to increase the 
appeal of the stock to individual investors. A lower share price could increase the pool 
of potential investors in the company, and so the demand for the stock will increase. 
It is sometimes also argued that this will also increase the stock’s liquidity. This 
argument has a long tradition and some empirical support, but it does not explain 
many of the key facts presented in the previous section.  
Whittaker (1929) presents a comprehensive analysis of the meaning of a stock 
dividend and stock split. Starting as early as 1890 (e.g. Gibbons v. Mahon (136 U.S. 
594)), there were a number of lawsuits surrounding the appropriate treatment of stock 
dividends in the case of what would currently be considered skipping generation 
income trusts. When a stock dividend was declared and paid, it was unclear as to 
whether this was income to be distributed to the current beneficiary of the income 
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portion of the trust (generally a widow), or whether it was not income, in which case 
it was to be maintained as part of the principal portion on the trust which was held to 
the benefit of the subsequent trust beneficiary, known at the time as the 
“remainderman” (generally the children of the widow and the founder of the trust). 
This confusion as to how to treat a stock distribution extended into the realm of 
taxation as well. On a Federal level, the 16th amendment gave Congress the power to 
tax incomes in 1913, and the Revenue Act of 1916 explicitly declared stock dividends 
to be taxable income. However, the Supreme Court in 1920 ruled this taxation of 
stock distributions to be unconstitutional (Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189). 
While this may seem to be merely an interesting historical note, it highlights the 
confusion around stock dividends and stock distributions which motivated the first 
economic papers which analyzed stock splits and stock dividends. Not only was there 
widespread confusion, but there was also a dramatic increase in the frequency and 
amount of stock distributions. A sample of 5,000 corporations that had sufficient data 
to permit analysis and were listed continuously from 1913 through 1926 provides 
evidence of the importance of stock distributions. $543 million of stock dividends 
were paid from 1913 to 1920 (the “taxable period”), and $4,777 million of stock 
dividends were paid from 1920 to 1929, for well in excess of a 775% increase. For 
comparative purposes, the same firms paid $5,693 million in cash dividends, so the 
cash-dividend to stock-dividend ratio was approximately 1.2:1.0. 
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Whittaker was one of the first papers to highlight the marketability issue as a 
possible motivation for stock distributions. “If shares that have a high market value 
(for example, $500) are brought by a sufficiently large stock dividend to an ordinary 
level (perhaps $100), the price is said to be brought within the trading range. This will 
in general be favorable to a more active market and wider distribution of the stock. 
Perhaps these effects are desired by the management.” (pg. 33) While this is not the 
only rational Whittaker posits for stock distributions, it does suggest that there was a 
common belief in an “ordinary level” for stocks at approximately $100/share prior to 
the Great Depression. Furthermore, it motivates much of the later work done in the 
area, including attempts to uncover managers’ motivations for undertaking stock 
distributions. 
Dolley’s (1933) subsequent study specifically sought to address this question of 
managers’ motivations through a survey of 88 corporations that had split their shares 
in the 1920s. Out of the 36 responding firms, 33 corporations reported that the 
primary objective was to increase the marketability of their common stocks. 
Furthermore, in his sample of 103 stock splits, 90 of the firms that split their shares 
had a stock price exceeding $100 prior to the split, with some as high as $900/share. 
In contrast, 95 of the firms split to a stock price under $100. This price regularity is 
the first evidence he presents of the managers acting in a way that is consistent with 
their survey response. 
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In addition to noting that splits are primarily undertaken by firms with high 
prices, and that the split ratio appears to be targeting a significantly lower price, the 
paper also presents evidence around whether this change in price did, in fact, increase 
the marketability of the shares. The paper shows limited evidence of any increase in 
trading volume (except for a temporary increase immediately around the share 
issuance/distribution), and a decrease in dollar volume traded after the split. So, it is 
unclear as to whether liquidity increases after the split.  
However, consistent with the corporation’s survey responses, there is a marked 
increase in the distribution of shares. Specifically, in a small sample of 38 respondents 
to a question in the survey about the number of shareholders, 36 firms reported a 
significant increase in the number of individual common shareholders one year 
subsequent to the share split.  
Furthermore, despite considerable data limitations, the paper reports some 
positive price effect of the stock split. Approximately twice as many stock splits 
resulted in a price increase as compared to a price decrease. However, the change in 
price is quite small: for approximately two thirds of the sample that demonstrated 
some price impact of the stock split, the magnitude of the price impact was less than 
two points in absolute value.  
While Dolley’s (1933) survey results and empirical evidence are consistent with 
corporations targeting lower-priced shares to encourage broader ownership, there are 
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two important considerations to note. First, the data used in the paper was less 
reliable than what modern researchers are accustomed to, and the analysis, while 
groundbreaking, was a bit more primitive than what is currently practiced.17 As an 
example of the data limitations, Dolley notes that a number of the firms in the survey 
also issued new shares (separate from the share split), and that the trading volume 
accompanying the price data used to measure price changes was often low, in some 
cases as little as 10 shares or 100 shares in a week. Because of this, the paper is careful 
to not make any claim about causality. Second, a $100 nominal share price in 1925 
was certainly more difficult for a retail investor to trade than a $100 nominal share 
price in 2005, due to inflation and numerous other factors.  
Barker (1956) investigates 90 NYSE listed companies that executed a split with 
a ratio of 2:1 to 3:1 between 1951 and 1953. The most cited finding of this research 
seems to be that persistent abnormal returns were associated exclusively with firms 
that contemporaneously split their stock and also increased their cash dividend, and 
firms that only undertook a stock split, without an accompanying cash dividend 
increase, quickly reversed any announcement effect gains within six months and 
generated zero abnormal returns. More importantly for this discussion, however, was 
his finding that “The lower per-share price resulting from a stock split-up does bring 
the stock within the financial reach of more investors and traders.” (pp 103-104) After 
                                                     
17 For evidence on the novelty and importance of Dolley’s work, Craig MacKinlay points to this 
work as one of (if not the) first published event study (MacKinlay (1997), p 13). 
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matching the split firms to non-splitting firms in the same S&P industry 34 
subgroups, he finds an approximately 25 percent differential gain in the number of 
shareholders in splitting companies. While this may be a result of the stock split, he 
cannot rule out other channels that may have driven the increase in the number of 
shareholders (e.g. firms with higher performance could garner greater media and 
analyst coverage, leading to greater share ownership, independent of the stock split 
itself). So, I once again see limited direct empirical evidence of increased marketability 
due to share splits. 
Eismann and Moses (1978) surveyed 80 firms (39 responses) which paid stock 
dividends and 89 firms (58 response) which did not pay a stock dividend in 1974. The 
motivation for this survey is the question that is repeatedly asked in the stock 
distribution literature: if we generally believe that stock distributions are primarily a 
cosmetic action, why do so many firms undertake this action? Of the six survey 
responses that had greater than 50 percent “agree” response rates, only one is 
consistent with a marketability explanation. 78.9 percent of stock dividend payers (and 
60.3 percent of non-payers) agreed with the statement, “One effect of stock dividends 
is to ultimately increase the number of shareholders in the firm.” Surprisingly, trading 
range as the mechanism for “marketability” appears to have no meaningful support. 
Only 34.2 percent of stock dividend payers agreed (while 34.2 percent expressed “no 
opinion” and 31.6 percent disagreed) and 20.7 percent of non-payers agreed (while 
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19.0 percent expressed “no opinion” and 60.3 percent disagreed) with the statement 
“Stock dividends keep a firm’s stock price in an optimal price range.” Similarly, there 
is limited consensus in the survey as to whether the larger number of shares 
outstanding made the stock more attractive, or allowed small stockholders to 
purchase round lots. So, at least for stock distributions in the form of stock dividends, 
there was very limited survey evidence consistent with a marketability hypothesis. 
Baker and Gallagher (1980) performed a survey modeled on the work of 
Eismann and Moses (1978), but focused on firms which undertook stock splits 
instead of stock dividends. The survey was of chief financial officers of two groups of 
firms, one that had split (100 firms, 63 responses) and another that had not (100 
firms, 64 responses). For both groups, they report that the most popular reason for 
splitting is to “make it easier for small stockholders to purchase round lots (more 
shares, lower price).” Within the stock split group, 98.4 percent agreed with the 
marketability hypothesis, and even within the non-split group, 93.8 percent supported 
this claim of increased marketability of shares at lower prices. There was also 
significant support for two other statements. 93.7 percent of split firms (78.1 percent 
of non-split firms) agreed with the statement, “Stock splits keep a firm’s stock price in 
an optimal price range” and 85.4 percent of split firms (76.6 percent of non-split 
firms) agreed with the statement, “One effect of stock splits is to ultimately increase 
the number of shareholders in the firm.” Finally, 65.0 percent of managers who had 
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affected a stock split listed the most important reason for so doing as leading to a 
lower share price (with over 50 percent explicitly invoking the lower price as a 
mechanism to obtain optimal trading range or attracting investors). 75.0 percent of 
non-split managers stated that they did not do a stock split because their price was 
already in or below the optimal range. So, in contrast to the stock dividend survey, the 
stock split survey provides evidence that managers are actively seeking to improve 
their shares’ marketability through the direct targeting of a lower price. Furthermore, 
there appears to be little change in managers’ belief that lower stock prices can be 
used to attract investors from 1930 to 1980. 
Stock Splits (Baker and Powell (1993)) and stock dividends (Baker and Phillips 
(1993)) were again the subject of surveys in 1993. The stock split survey covered a 
larger sample of both NYSE and AMEX firms (248 surveys, 136 responses), and the 
stock dividend survey added coverage of NASDAQ firms (299 surveys, 136 
responses). They also widened the scope of the earlier stock split surveys in an 
attempt to both update the previous studies, as well as provide evidence that could 
allow some test of the prevailing theories. Consistent with the Dolley (1933) and 
Baker and Gallagher (1980) results, the three statements with which stock splitting 
managers are most likely to agree in Baker and Powell’s (1993) survey revolve around 
a preferred trading range being more attractive to investors, and allow for a broader 
ownership. Specifically, 93.3 percent of managers agree with the statement, “A stock 
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split makes shares more attractive by lowering the stock price,” 91.2 percent of 
respondents agree with the statement, “A stock split puts a firm’s stock price in a 
preferred trading range,” and 87.8 percent agreed with the statement, “Stock splits 
make it easier for small shareholders to buy shares in round lots.” In Baker and 
Phillips (1993) survey of stock dividends, over 90 percent of managers agree with a 
primarily behavioral explanation, “Stock Dividends have a positive psychological 
impact on investors receiving them.” In contrast to the earlier studies of stock 
dividends, the survey results exhibit an increased belief that stock dividends keep 
share prices in a preferred trading range, and a significantly decreased belief that stock 
dividends are a substitute for cash dividends. However, consistent with earlier surveys 
and with my norms hypothesis, the highest ranked motive continues to be the 
historical precedent. 42.9 percent of respondents list this as their primary motive for 
paying stock dividends. 
The second potion of their survey provides further confirmatory evidence. 50.7 
percent of managers listed moving the stock price into a better trading range as their 
primary rational for undertaking a split. Improving liquidity and signaling positive 
managerial beliefs about the firm’s future prospects both received significant support 
as well. In an empirical analysis of the firms’ split ratios and targeted prices, the 
authors find that the preferred trading range appears to be between $20 and $35. 
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Interestingly, even some managers of open-end mutual funds support the 
trading-range hypothesis, with 40.4 percent agreeing that “a lower NAV [net asset 
value] per share attracts more investors” (Fernando et al, 1999). 
Not only do managers appear to have this belief, but also several empirical 
studies have provided evidence that can be interpreted as supportive of the 
marketability hypothesis under certain conditions. Sosnick (1961) presents an early 
analysis of when the benefits of a stock distribution would outweigh its costs, and 
concludes “The potential benefits are greater convenience and value, and possibly 
conversion of odd lots, a lower odd lot differential… (and) wider ownership…. 
However, it seems unlikely that these various benefits would in fact outweigh the 
burdens unless price per share is very high – say above $200 – and is brought into a 
popular price range…. A ratio large enough to bring price per share below $40 would 
decrease the odd lot differential, and a ratio large enough to bring the price below $20 
would reduce the rate of the New York stock transfer tax.”( page 69). So, while there 
is an explicitly described set of mechanisms that would allow for greater marketability, 
Sosnick argues that it would be most likely to be realized for very high priced stocks 
undergoing very large splits (of 5:1 or 10:1).  
Nichols and McDonald (1983) find that split factors are positively correlated 
with pre-split share prices, and negatively correlated with market capitalization. Dyl 
and Elliott (2005) document a positive correlation between share price and 
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institutional ownership, suggesting that individuals might prefer lower-priced stocks. 
Fernando et al. (2004) document a positive correlation between institutional 
ownership and share prices of initial public offerings. One could conclude that 
institutional investors prefer high share prices due to lower brokerage commissions, 
whereas individual investors can only afford buying round lots of low-priced shares.  
However, direct tests of the increased marketability for common stocks 
subsequent to a stock split suggest that there is no long-term increase in marketability. 
For example, Copeland (1979) studies a random sample of 25 splits of 1.25:1 or 
greater by NYSE listed firms from 1963 to 1974, and finds volume is decreased 
following a split, and transaction costs increase by 27.51 percent (mean) or 7.92 
percent (median). 162 OTC stocks (1968-1976) provide a separate sample for bid-ask 
spreads, which increase 4.95 percent to 6.79 percent of price for a 40 day window 
around the split. Copeland concludes that there is a permanent decrease in liquidity 
post-split. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) find that volume before and after a stock split 
are insignificantly different, as do Maloney and Mulherin (1992). Despite the lack of 
any increased trading volume, Lakonishok and Lev (1987) do note the possibility of 
increases of other measures of marketability (such as share ownership base), and 
Maloney and Mulherin (1992) find some evidence of an increase in the number of 
shareholders after the split, as well as an increased number of small trades. The 
increase in share ownership and retail investor ownership is supported in other studies 
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as well. Lamoreaux and Poon (1987) investigate the time series from 1962 to 1985 for 
NYSE and AMEX listed stocks with splits of 1.5:1 or greater, and all reverse splits, 
resulting in 217 stock split observations, uncontaminated by other announcements in 
a three day window around the event. They find an increase in the number of 
shareholders in the year of a split by 34.65 percent, compared with a 2.11 percent 
decrease for control firms. They also find that the value of shares traded falls 
subsequent to ex-split day. These two facts combined are suggestive of one-time 
clientele shift. Easley, O’Hara, and Saar (2001), in a study of 72 NYSE stocks that 
undertook 2:1 splits in 1995, find results consistent with “preferred trading range”, 
because of increased uninformed trading, and new clientele, but inconsistent with 
optimal tic size. They find no increase in liquidity, because of increase in informed 
trading and increased spreads based on increased volatility. Kadapakka, 
Krishnamurthy, and Tse (2005) find that the ex-date is associated with small investor 
buying and positive abnormal returns, but results do not hold post decimalization. 
Byun and Rozeff, (2003) find some short term effects, but they are very small. 
Interestingly, this also points to a regularity noted in several of the survey 
papers: there is ample evidence that when managers think about “liquidity” they seem 
to be referring to breadth of ownership, and not bid-ask spreads, or total dollar 
volume of trade.  
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More importantly for my investigation, the marketability hypothesis makes 
clear-cut predictions that are inconsistent with many of the patterns of constant 
nominal share prices. For example, why didn’t share prices keep up with inflation? 
According to the marketability hypothesis, individuals have a budget constraint that 
restricts them to lower-priced shares. Suppose, for example, that an individual would 
like to diversify across ten stocks, and she has only $25,000 to invest. If she allocates 
$2,500 to each stock, and she is restricted to buying “round lots” (shares in multiples 
of 100), she can pay no more than $25 a share. This simple arithmetic ignores one 
important consideration: the investor who had $25,000 to invest in 1933 is likely to 
have much more money (in nominal terms) today. It seems natural to assume that the 
budget constraint of the average individual investor should remain approximately 
constant in real dollars.  
Assuming that the funds available for investing increase with inflation, then the 
marketability hypothesis clearly predicts that nominal share prices should keep up 
with inflation.  
Otherwise, I am left with the incredible conclusion that the “preferred trading 
range” is set by some very impoverished and undesirable investor. Firms engage in 
odd-lot buyback programs specifically to eliminate these small investors, as the 
servicing costs of $19 per shareholder per annum can be high when compared to the 
value held by a small shareholder (Frieswick, (2002)). Curiously, firms that have odd-
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lot buyback programs continue to split their shares, presumably making their shares 
attractive to the same class of small investors they intentionally bought out. For 
example, ESCO Technologies, (NYSE: ESE) held a voluntary buyback program for 
shareholders with fewer than 100 shares from March 3rd to April 3rd, 2003 when its 
stock was trading at approximately $34, and subsequently did a 2:1 stock split on 
September 26th, 2005, reducing its stock price from approximately $100 to $50 per 
share.  
We also note that many mutual funds have a minimum initial investment 
requirement, which is consistent with our claim that very small shareholders are not 
the preferred investors by most firms. The data refute what is arguably the most basic 
prediction of the marketability hypothesis. 
The idea that stock splits are undertaken by firms to maintain a preferred 
trading range for retail investors is problematic for other reasons as well. First, many 
firms offer direct investment programs that allow investors to buy small quantities of 
shares without any commissions (Scholes and Wolfson (1989)). Second, over the past 
20 years the pricing of retail brokerage has changed in a way that makes the 
marketability hypothesis untenable. Many brokerage firms charge a flat fee for trades 
up to 20,000 shares. This commission structure means that retail investors should 
have no preference about the number of shares that they trade. Also, while trading 
odd lots was difficult and expensive historically, 
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no longer the case.18 So unless individual investors have specific preferences for lower 
priced stocks unrelated to their budget considerations, the marketability hypothesis is 
inconsistent with the facts. And if investors do have such preferences, why would 
their preferences for lower-priced stocks depend on the size of the company?  
The marketability hypothesis also makes a clear prediction about diversified 
investment vehicles. In the mutual fund and exchange-traded fund settings, where a 
retail investor can obtain a well-diversified portfolio by purchasing one security, the 
marketability hypothesis predicts no splits at all. However, exchange-traded funds split 
their shares. For example, on April 24, 2006, the Rydex equal weight Standard & 
Poor’s index fund executed a 4:1 split, and on June 13, 2005, a dozen different iShares 
funds managed by Barclays Global Investors split either 2:1 or 3:1. In the case of 
open-end mutual funds, prediction is even more dramatic. The share price of such a 
fund is irrelevant, because you can purchase or sell whatever dollar value you want 
and the fund will calculate fractions of shares as necessary. And yet mutual funds do 
split. Moreover, I note that many mutual funds have a minimum initial investment 
requirement, which is consistent with my claims that very small shareholders are not 
                                                     
18 In fact, there is some evidence that odd-lot trades get better execution on the New York Stock 
Exchange because of Rule 124, and the elimination of the odd-lot differential in 1991. Rule 124 
effectively requires specialists to execute odd-lots at the same price as the most recent, or next, trade.  
An example of the benefits of odd-lot trading was highlighted in 2004 when the NYSE announced 
that it was imposing a censure and $50,000 fine against Westminster Securities Corporation. The 
alleged abuse by Westminster was breaking up customer round-lot orders into odd- lot orders to 
sneak them ahead of other round-lot orders awaiting execution. The full text of Rule 124 is available 
at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/Help/Map/rules-sys186.html. 
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the preferred investors by most firms, and mutual fund splits are hard to rationalize 
under the marketability hypothesis. 
Finally, the marketability hypothesis suggests that share prices should respond 
to changes in the composition of stock owners—in particular, to the dramatic 
increase in institutional ownership that has occurred. According to the NYSE 
Factbook, the percent of corporate stocks that were directly owned by individuals 
declined from 90.2 percent in 1950, to 41.1 percent in 1998. At the same time, indirect 
holdings of corporate stocks, such as via mutual funds, have increased many-fold 
from 3.3 to 27.5 percent, and the fraction of stock owned by non-households, such as 
defined benefit pensions, has increased from 6.5 to 31.4 percent, as seen in the 
Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts data. Non-retail trading in at least some 
securities accounted for 96 percent of New York Stock Exchange trading volume in 
2002 (Jones and Lipson, 2003). In short, institutional holdings and trading dominate 
the market. 
The major reduction in direct household holdings, and the corresponding 
increase in institutional holdings and trading, indicates that there has been a significant 
change in the characteristics of investors. Therefore, the marketability hypothesis 
would predict higher prices as this investor composition shift occurs, and firms cater 
to the new class of important investors. However, we already saw that share prices 
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remained around $30 throughout the entire period, despite the major changes in stock 
ownership.  
The nominal share price puzzle could also be related to characteristics of the 
retail investor.19 For example, perhaps a few very wealthy individuals held stock in 
earlier periods, but now many more, though less-wealthy, individuals hold equity 
securities directly. The reduction in real price over time could then be a consequence 
of the fact that those less wealthy individuals are the marginal investors. However, the 
level of direct equity participation now and 80 years ago is quite similar. For example, 
the percentage of households with direct holdings of shares of stock in the 1920s was 
around 20 percent, roughly the same as in the late 1990s. As mutual funds have 
become increasingly popular since the mid-1960s, most individuals’ stock-holdings are 
indirect, through these funds. Moreover, even nowadays stock ownership is highly 
concentrated: The wealthiest ten percent of the population in the United States owns 
85.1 percent of common stock, and approximately one half of all households have 
zero stock holdings (Mishel, Bernstein, Allegretto (2005)). It seems unlikely that the 
nominal price stationarity can be attributed to changing characteristics of retail 
investors. 
                                                     
19 I thank George Akerlof for his suggestion to investigate this point. 
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2. The Pay To Play Hypothesis 
A related hypothesis, which also posits an optimal trading range for stock 
prices, is based on the notion that firms set their share prices to induce 
brokers/dealers to provide liquidity through higher market-making profitability. Angel 
(1997) develops a theory of “relative tick size.” In this approach, firms split their stock 
to lower the share price and increase the ratio of tick size (defined as the minimum 
possible difference between the bid and the ask price) to share price. A higher relative 
tick size economically motivates more dealers to make markets for the stock, and to 
provide more liquidity.  
This theory is consistent with the pattern observed in the United States over 
the period 1930-1996 where both tick sizes and prices remained constant. However, 
the theory predicts that if tick sizes fall, prices should fall as well. A natural test is 
provided by the decimalization that occurred on the New York Stock Exchange. As 
Angel (1997, page 678) boldly stated: “[A] reduction in the minimum price variation 
from $0.125 to $0.01 could eventually lead to a reduction in the average share price by 
the same factor, 12.5, resulting in an average share price around $3.” Starting in 1997, 
the natural experiment Angel hypothesized actually took place. The tick size on the 
NYSE changed from 1/8 to 1/16 and then to 1/100. But Angel’s prediction was not 
very successful.  Rather than falling by a factor of 12.5, share prices remained roughly 
constant during this period. Similarly, the reduction in minimum tick size on the 
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Toronto stock exchange did not result in a like reduction in the average prices of 
shares traded on that exchange.  
Another problem with this theory is that it is hard to see why large firms would 
feel any need to pay anyone to provide liquidity. Does the management at Microsoft 
or GE think that their shares would not trade if the price were $500 or $1,000 when 
Berkshire Hathaway, which has traded at over $100,000 per share, is among the most 
consistently profitable stocks traded by specialist firm LaBranche?20 Even putting 
aside Berkshire Hathaway, Google’s management seems to share my view that this 
argument is implausible since their share price has traded above $700 and the firm 
appears to have no intention of splitting. Clayton Moran, an analyst with Stanford 
Group, remarked that "All the indications I get from the company is that they are 
comfortable with a stock price that implies a superiority to competitors so I don't 
think they are motivated to split the stock” (La Monica, 2006)  
Finally, the tick size explanation can provide no explanation for mutual fund 
splits. 
                                                     
20 “As a rule, the spread on Berkshire A shares fluctuates between $100 and $200 a share. (On most 
other shares on the Big Board, the spread is a matter of pennies.)  Like other chief executives, Mr. 
Buffett doesn't want to see big spreads between buyers and sellers of his stock. However, large 
spreads can be lucrative for specialist firms. "I want Berkshire to be a good stock for LaBranche, but 
not the best stock," says Mr. Buffett, referring to Mr. Maguire's employer, the specialist company 
LaBranche & Co.  Berkshire shares rank among LaBranche's most consistently profitable stocks, but 
not the most profitable, says owner Michael LaBranche” (Richardson, 2005). 
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3. The Signaling Hypothesis 
In a world of asymmetric information between those insiders who are 
managers and those outsiders who are investors, insiders may wish to convey their 
private information to the outsiders in the market, even if it is costly to do so. Several 
papers suggest that a stock split may serve as such a signaling device. As in all 
signaling models, two immediate questions arise: 1) What do the managers signal, and 
2) What is the cost of the signal?  
More generally, signaling theories propose explanations of puzzling behavior, 
such as investments in costly displays. The investment in a costly display can be 
supported under the following conditions. First, there must be a characteristic which 
is obscured by information asymmetry. Second, if this obscured characteristic were 
observable, the strategy of the players in the environment would be a function of this 
characteristic. Third, the costly display must be observable. Fourth, there must be a 
common set of beliefs between the displayers and the observers about the correlation 
of the costly display and the unobservable. Fifth, the display allows for at least a 
partially separating equilibrium, as the cost of the signal precludes a subset from 
imitating the signal. Finally, the cost of the signal (and the cost of falsely signaling) 
must be borne by the entity making the signal. 
Biological sciences provide examples of certain costly exhibitions that 
distinguish certain individuals as being more desirable. Presumably, there are some 
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differences between corporate and non-human signaling. However, I will use 
biological examples here as it allows me to build intuition and highlight certain 
important features without triggering the reader’s desire to skip this section, as 
undoubtedly the reader is familiar with the economic signaling models, and needs no 
exposition from me to heighten her understanding. 
Classic examples of biological signaling are often related to mating behavior. 
For example, in certain species of flies, longer eye stalks are correlated with more 
mating opportunities.21 For a signaling model to hold in this fly-mating setting, I can 
invoke the above listed conditions. First, the obscured characteristic is the probability 
of producing robust offspring, or the probability of successfully fulfilling the 
biological imperative. Robust offspring can be characterized by their ability to locate 
food, efficiently convert food into energy, mate successfully, and pass along “robust” 
genes. For simplicity, I assume that the robustness of the male is highly correlated 
with the probability of it producing robust offspring. Male robustness, however, is not 
observable: an observation of a male fly by a female fly would not fully reveal his 
robustness. Since the survival and mating success of offspring is a future event, and 
since flies presumably are not precognitive, I claim that robustness is an obscured 
characteristic. Second, female flies presumably would prefer to mate with the most 
robust males, so the mating strategy of the female flies presumably would be a 
                                                     
21 "stalk eyed flies have become canonical examples of the action of sexual selection and the evolution of male sexual 
traits (Wilkinson, 2001; Maynard Smith and Harper, 2004).." Pomiankowski et al. (2005), page 1166 
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function of robustness, were it not obscured. Third, eye stalk length is clearly an 
observable characteristic, as the length of the eyestalk can exceed the insect’s own 
body length.22 Fourth, it has been empirically demonstrated that females choose to 
mate with longer eye-stalked males, and males in the species make large investments 
in the growth of their eye stalks. While this is not conclusive proof that there is a 
shared belief between the males (“if I grow longer eye-stalks, females will know that I 
am robust”) and the females (“males with longer eyestalks are more robust”), it is 
consistent with these shared beliefs.23 Finally, the eyestalks do provide for a partially 
separating equilibrium. Males with longer eyestalks are the preferred mates of females, 
and males grow the largest eyestalks that they can. Less robust males cannot invest in 
longer eyestalks, and have lower mating success. 
The stalk-eyed fly example is intriguing as there is nothing special, ex ante, 
about the convergence on eye stalks as the signal. Longer eye stalks appear to have no 
benefit to the males of the species except in terms of mating selection. In fact, long 
eye stalks are quite costly to males: they reduce the field of binocular vision, and they 
restrict mobility in flight (Ribiak and Swallow 2007). Clearly, the signaling mechanism 
must be costly, otherwise it could be undertaken by low quality males, and therefore 
could not be a reliable signal. While the eyestalks do appear to be a reliable indicator 
                                                     
22 “In a number of stalk eyed fly species, female mate preferences have driven the evolution of exaggerated male eye 
stalks, which in extreme cases exceeds body length (Wilkinson and Reiollo, 1994; Wilkinson and Dodson, 1997; Hingle 
et al., 2001)” ).." Pomiankowski et al. (2005) page 1166 
23 Using the term “beliefs” in this setting is a horrible abuse of the English language, but I request the reader’s 
indulgence to allow consistency with game theory and microeconomic terminology.  
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of robustness, there is no compelling reason that some other signal could have been 
used to convey the information about the male’s robustness (Zimmer, 2008).  
In non-human signaling, the equilibrium signal is generally the result of random 
mutations and convergence upon a norm. It is this “norm” characteristic that is often 
glossed over in the economic literature. Almost any costly investment in any 
meaningless display could serve as the signal. All the potential benefits of signaling 
can only be realized if there is a norm. This norm is the convergence of beliefs on the 
information context of a specific signal. This deserves special attention in the 
corporate finance setting.  
Any odd behavior could be supported as a signal, which makes rejecting 
signaling stories difficult. However, if we believe that human managers have a greater 
ability to optimize than a fly, the signal should be efficient (i.e. the lowest cost 
mechanism which creates a separating equilibrium); if stock distributions are not the 
most efficient signaling mechanism, then these models are difficult to accept.  
The biological cost of expending energy on specific characteristics which give 
no obvious benefits in terms of individual survival could be a second best outcome in 
terms of species survival if certain conditions are met. First, mating partners must 
hold a common belief that the observable result of having taken the costly action (in 
this case long eyestalks) is correlated with unobservable and desirable attributes. This 
norm correlation between an observable but unimportant characteristic and an 
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unobservable but important characteristic is key to all signaling theories. Since any 
unimportant characteristic could act as the signal, convergence on a norm about 
which specific unimportant observable characteristic will be converged upon as the 
"key" characteristic for selecting an optimal mate is equally important. 
If there is no convergence upon a single norm, the attempts at signaling are 
likely to have lower realized benefits. Assume that the female of the species has the 
ability to select her partner for mating purposes. Now consider that there are two 
types of females. The first female type believes that a display of colorful plumage (the 
observable but inherently unimportant characteristic) correlates with desirable 
characteristics. The second female type believes that a loud call correlates with 
desirable characteristics. For the males, there are two dimensions of characteristics. 
First the males can be of a "good" or "bad" type, where the good type and bad type 
are defined by inherently important, but unobservable characteristics. Second, males 
of the "good" type have the capacity to invest in either colorful plumage or in a loud 
call. Compare that setting to one in which the females of the species have coordinated 
onto a single norm where colorful plumage is desirable. No good type male would 
choose to invest in a loud call in this setting, thereby making a single signal 
environment more efficient. By extension, while the investment in colorful plumage is 
still costly, it is more likely to result in mating. Keeping this in mind we can now 
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investigate signaling stories to identify what is the fixed cost, and whether this cost is 
borne exclusively by high-type firms. 
Brennan and Copeland (1988) develop a model in which undervalued firms use 
stock splits to signal the quality and strength of their future prospects. In their model, 
splits are credible signals because they are costly. Since commissions are related to the 
number of shares traded, investors would save money by trading a smaller number of 
shares, each having a higher share price. Another component of the costs is the bid-
ask spread. The relative bid-ask spread—defined as the bid-ask spread for $1 worth of 
trade—is greater post-split, as my own tests and previous studies show (for example, 
Conroy, Harris, Benet, 1990). There are also administrative costs that add to the cost 
of the split, as mentioned earlier. In a signaling model, undervalued firms increase the 
number of shares and decrease share prices to signal their higher quality.24 In 
equilibrium, one might expect under-valued firms to end up with lower share prices 
than over-valued firms. The greater the split factor and the lower the price, the more 
credible the signal and the more likely the firm is under-valued. A final implication of 
the signaling hypothesis is that the market reaction to the split should be positive. 
If stock splits are a rational economic signal, then they presumably should be 
correlated with future profitability. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) report that profitability 
                                                     
24 Note that the signaling explanation is the opposite of the “pay to play” explanation: In the first, 
the split reduces liquidity and the costs are truly just burning money. In the second, the costs are 
effectively a payment for better liquidity and promotion. However both stories (and the entire 
literature related to splits) are premised upon the fact that costs of trade are increased by stock splits. 
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does increase significantly, but it does so prior to the split rather than after the split. 
Asquith and Healy (1989) also find large earning increases, and returns, prior to a 
split, but none thereafter. Do splitting firms try to signal that they have already 
reached their peak and their growth rate should revert back to a lower level? That 
interpretation seems unlikely. The price of shares after stock splits seems less 
consistent with signaling than with “rejoining the herd” at the near-constant nominal 
stock price. 
The evidence on price performance after splits is not uniform. In the seminal 
paper on this subject, Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) found that firms having a 
stock split have experienced abnormal returns of 34 percent in the in the 30 months 
leading up to the split, but experience no abnormal returns thereafter. Byun and 
Rozeff (2003) find that any abnormal returns subsequent to a split are specific to the 
sample period chosen. Some studies do find abnormal returns over long horizons 
after splits, but such studies are very sensitive to the methods used, and there is no 
consensus on the results.25 
The signaling model also predicts less information asymmetry after splits, since 
management’s private information has already been conveyed to the market via the 
                                                     
25  For example, Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) find median abnormal returns of 27 percent 
in the four months prior to the stock split, and 3 percent in the four months subsequent to the split. 
Desai and Jain (1997) find buy and hold abnormal returns of 7.05 percent in the year after the split, 
which suggests that the firm continues to have good performance post-split, and yet the signal is not 
fully incorporated into prices by the market. Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996) and Ikenberry and 
Sundaresh (2002) find abnormal returns of between 8 and 9 percent, and abnormally low negative 
earnings realization in the year subsequent to the split. 
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split. This ought to lead to a reduction in “informed trades” following splits. Easley, 
O’Hara, and Saar (1998) examine this prediction and find no evidence that 
information asymmetry is reduced after splits.  
Several of the facts I discussed earlier also seem at odds with the signaling 
hypothesis. Many exchange-traded funds are passive index funds, and it is very 
difficult to believe that they somehow have superior “inside information” that the 
underlying index they hold is going to outperform in subsequent periods--and yet they 
split. Mutual funds split, too, yet it is difficult to construct a model in which the funds 
can (much less do) predict out-performance. ADRs, or American Depository 
Receipts, are a financial vehicle that represents a certain number of shares of a foreign 
stock, but they are denominated in dollars and sold on U.S. stock exchanges. 
Unsponsored ADRs split, while their home country security, where most of the trades 
are done, does not (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996). The depository bank that 
created the unsponsored ADR is unlikely to have better “inside information” on the 
future prospects of the firm than do the managers of the firm itself. From these 
examples, it seems difficult to identify exactly what splits signal.  
Signaling theories also imply that as the cost of the signal changes, the intensity 
of the signal should change as well. Thus when brokerage commissions dramatically 
decreased with the shift from fixed minimum to negotiated commission on “Mayday” 
in May, 1975 and again with the penetration of discount brokers, we should have 
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observed a like decline in share price. Similarly, the reduction in the minimum bid-ask 
over a very brief period in time should have an abrupt impact on share prices, which it 
has not. From 1933 to 1997 the minimum tick size remained constant at 1/8 of a 
nominal dollar, June 23, 1997 marked the first change in nominal tick size from 1/8 to 
1/16, and January 29, 2001 marked the NYSE's transition to having all stocks quoted 
in decimals, and yet throughout these changes, prices have remained remarkably 
constant. In summary, the evidence casts doubt that signaling could explain share 
prices remaining at a nominal price of $30 since the Great Depression. 
Finally, there are some questions that always arise with signaling hypotheses. 
Firms that split their shares are primarily those whose shares have greatly increased in 
price.  Why is this signal more likely to be available in bull markets or for firms that 
have been doing exceptionally well?  Wouldn’t firms in down markets (or firms that 
have done poorly in the recent past) also have private information they would like to 
signal? In fact, why don’t low price firms use splits to signal strong future prospects, 
since a split to an abnormally low price would seem to be an especially strong signal? 
Finally, why does every high priced company undertake this specific signal? Does 
every high priced firm have good future prospects, except for Berkshire Hathaway 
and Google? 
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4. Customs and Norms 
As Sherlock Holmes liked to say, “When you have eliminated the impossible, 
whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.” The standard economic 
explanations for stock splits cannot account for the facts surrounding the nominal 
share price puzzle, so I must consider alternatives. I consider the possibility that firms 
are simply following convention when they set the share price. They set the price to 
whatever is considered the norm. Unlike the norm of driving on either the left- or 
right-hand side of the road, in this case there is no strong penalty for violating the 
norm. Having an outlier price such as Berkshire Hathaway or Google will not get you 
killed. However, the norm is sufficiently engrained that going against it invites 
scrutiny. Almost every in-depth article in the popular press on Berkshire Hathaway 
comments on its unusually high per share price, and on Warren Buffet’s unwillingness 
to split the stock. 
Interestingly, the norm of an average price of about $30-$40 has been formed 
only since the 1929 crash. Figure 9 shows that until the crash in 1929 stock prices 
were much higher. Prior to 1915 share prices were quoted as a percentage of their par 
value, not in dollars (Angel, 1997), and it was very common for par values to be set at 
$100 a share. Recall the earlier quote from Whittaker (1929): “If shares that have a 
high market value (for example, $500) are brought by a sufficiently large stock 
dividend to an ordinary level (perhaps $100), the price is said to be brought within the 
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trading range.” (pg. 33) This comment again highlights the pervasive belief that there 
is an “ordinary” level for prices, which is consistent with my norms premise: there 
was a convention of stock prices being approximately $100/share prior to the great 
depression, and stock splits targeted this conventional price.  
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Figure 9: Nominal Equal Weighted Average Price per Share of Securities 
Listed on the NYSE and AMEX, 1815 to 200726 
 
  
                                                     
26 Data for January 1815 to December 1925 is from the “NYSE Monthly Price File from 1815 to 
1925,” made available from the NYSE History Research Project by the International Center of 
Finance, Yale University. The data for January 1926 to the present is from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
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However, after the market crash of 1929 share prices dropped from roughly 
$70 to $30 and have never increased. This pattern suggests that the norm around 
share prices can be changed in response to a dramatic shock. Additional anecdotal 
evidence from Europe around the introduction of the euro currency suggests that 
price norms can be broken when the set of “peer” firms change. After the 
introduction of the euro, for example, many Italian-listed companies reportedly 
considered reverse stock splits to raise their trading prices to more “respectable” 
levels (Bologna, 1999). 
Admittedly, because no formal model exists of how norms are created and 
maintained, it is difficult to test the norms hypothesis. At this stage, I can conjecture 
about the process of the formation of the “price-range norm.” Perhaps $30/share was 
a binding constraint for investors in the 1930s. The average annual income in the 
1930s in the United States was under $1,400, making a $30 purchase a meaningful 
amount of money. With this in mind, the findings of Dooley (1930) are plausible – a 
lower price allowed investors to purchase shares of the companies, and therefore 
increased the breadth of share ownership. For example, a May 17, 1916, article in the 
New York Times reported that the Willys-Overland Company (automotive) split its 
shares 4:1, moving its price from approximately $225/share to $56. Anticipation of 
the increased participation by a broader set of investors precipitated by the split had 
led to almost a 15 percent increase in price. However, by 2004 the mean annual 
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income in the United States exceeded $60,000. This dramatic increase in nominal 
income, by over 40 times, makes $30/share seem no longer relevant as a binding 
constraint. In other words, the $30 share price is a vestigial norm. 
If investors used price information for classifying firms (perhaps because of 
information costs or bounded rationality), it made sense for firms to coordinate on 
price. Once established, the norm for firms to split their stocks when the per-share 
price has gotten high became self-reinforcing. When considered in the time series, 
each of the explanations for why a particular share price might have been optimal at 
one point in time also leads to the conclusion that $30/share could not have been 
optimal in 1930, 2007, and every date in between. However, the active targeting of a 
price of $30/share persisted throughout this time series.  
Regardless as to what mechanism was initially responsible, once the behavior 
became a norm, it became self-reinforcing. In fact, there is some limited direct 
evidence supporting this idea. Barker (1956) states, “As it is, the large majority of split 
stocks end up in the $20 to $50 price range, simply because this is commonly thought by most 
executives and financial counselors to be the most popular one with investors” (page 105, my 
emphasis). While it is unlikely that any manager would admit to arbitrarily selecting 
the target stock price, it does seem reasonable that, in the face of contradictory 
evidence about why firms perform stock splits and what the benefits of a split, if any, 
may be, conventional wisdom or a heuristic could be used to make the choice. 
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Selecting a price which appears to be popular with investors is identical to selecting 
one which matches the level of previous splits by peer firms. Furthermore, matching 
peer firm prices is consistent with following a norm, particularly when there is no 
theory which can support the same price as being optimal for over 70 years! 
Furthermore, Eismann and Moses (1978) and Baker and Phillips (1993) report 
the single most frequent explanation cited as to why companies issued stock dividends 
was “Historical Company Practice.” They conclude “… managers may have read and 
understood the literature27, but still feel apprehensive about stockholder reaction to a 
change in the company’s historical stock dividend practice.” (pg.80) That managers 
would continue to take an action merely because it was done before, and that 
changing from the historic precedent would potentially cause alarm, is exactly what a 
model of norms would predict. 
As my discussion has suggested in a number of places, the norm is not quite as 
simple as “$30 a share.” Instead, the norm for the stock price of U.S. firms appears to 
depend on the firm’s characteristics, such as size and industry. Managers appear to 
choose stock splits in an attempt to bring share price back in line with that of their 
size and industry peers.  In Table 7, I report that over 62 percent of the variance in 
post-split prices can be explained by a model that predicts the split-targeted price by a 
firm’s share price deviation from its size and industry peers. When I restrict the 
                                                     
27 The authors are referring to the literature on stock distributions, which, as they state in the article 
introduction “frequently assert that shareholders get no genuine benefit from either the payment of 
stock dividends or the issuance of stock splits” pg 77 
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sample to “large” splits, defined as 1.25:1 or greater (which eliminates from the 
sample firms that have a policy of small annual dividends paid in the form of stock 
that otherwise the data may count as “splits”), I have even stronger results, with an R-
square of over 78 percent. This result supports the idea that firms are reluctant to 
deviate from the norm, and when they find themselves violating the pricing norm, 
they split to a price that rectifies the violation. My findings are consistent with other 
empirical work as well. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) report that post-split share prices 
converge to the industry norm. Similarly, McNichols and Dravid (1990) show that the 
further away the share prices are from the norm price, the higher the split factor. (See 
also Dyl and Elliott (2006)). 
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Table 7: The Price Targeted by Mangers via Stock Splits28 
 
Panel A: All Forward Splits 
Adj. R2 =0.6284 
N=16092 
Variable  
Parameter 
Estimate Standard Error t-value P 
Intercept 2.65406 0.12688 20.92 <0.0001 
(Pre-Split Price)- 
(Size Median Price) 0.34356 0.1080 31.82 <0.0001 
(Pre-Split Price)- 
(FF48 Industry Median Price) 0.24427 0.00945 25.85 <0.0001 
 
Panel B: Average All Splits greater than or equal to 1.25:1 
Adj. R2 =0.7851 
N=8370 
Variable  
Parameter 
Estimate Standard Error t-value P 
Intercept 3.00831 0.18731 16.06 <0.0001 
(Pre-Split Price)- 
(Size Median Price) 0.45406 0.01328 34.19 <0.0001 
(Pre-Split Price)- 
(FF48 Industry Median Price) 0.27384 0.01198 22.85 <0.0001 
 
  
                                                     
28 Data is from CRSP as previously described. I determine for each firm the month end price prior 
to the month in which it announces its split (Pre-Split Price), the price at month end of the split 
announcement (“Post-Split Price”), the median price of its size peers (as determined by size deciles) 
at the end of the year prior to the split announcement, (“Size Median Price”), and the median price 
of its industry peers (as determined by the Fama French 48 industry definitions) at the end of the 
year prior to the split announcement (FF48 Industry Median Price”). Panel A shows the regression 
results from all firms from 1933 through 2005 that had a forward split, and Panel B shows the 
results for all firms  from 1933 through 2005 that had a 1.25:1 or greater split.  The regression model 
is 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] εβ
βα
+−−+
+−−+=−−−
PriceMedian Industry  FF48PriceSplit Pre                                                            
PriceMedian  SizePriceSplit PreSplitPricePostPriceSplit Pre
2
1  
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The norm applies to foreign firms listed on US exchanges as well. For example, 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) note a consistency in the pricing of American 
Depository Receipts or ADRs—which, as described earlier, are securities representing 
a certain number of shares of foreign stock that are denominated in dollars and sold 
on U.S. stock exchanges. The share price on the home exchange is in line with that 
exchange’s pricing, and the number of shares packaged in an ADR brings its price in 
line with other securities on the foreign exchange. Share splits keep the prices at the 
appropriate norms. I also find evidence that Global Depository Receipts (“GDRs”), a 
similar type of security traded on the London exchange, are packaged at ratios which 
decrease the cross sectional variability of prices of the GDRs relative to the prices of 
the underlying securities.  
An interesting question is whether firms suffer economically by violating the 
norm. To investigate this question, I compare the returns of firms with high prices to 
firms with norm prices. Specifically, I run the following cross-sectional regression 
each year (from 1962 through 2005). ikk kj jji eIndustrydSizedp +++= ∑∑ ==
48
1
5
1
α
 
Where pi 
is the firm’s average annual price, Size is a dummy variable for 5 size quintiles, and 
Industry is a dummy for 48 industry categories provided by Eugene Fama and 
Kenneth French..  
I use the error term from the regression to rank order firms in terms of their 
deviation from the norm: I then use these ranks to assign firms into deciles, and call 
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the firms in the tenth decile (firms with the highest prices relative to their peers) 
“Norm Violators” and firms in the 5th and 6th deciles “Norm Adherents”. Every year I 
match each “Norm Violator” firm to a set of firms from the “Norm Adherent” group 
which are in the same book-to-market and size quintile. I then calculate the average 
return of the “Norm Violator” portfolio, and subtract the average return of the 
“Norm Adherent” portfolio of matched firms for each year. I then use the time series 
average of the difference in portfolio returns, and their standard deviation to calculate 
the difference in returns for firms that violate price norms, as opposed to those firms 
that adhere to the price norm. I find that the violators actually earn a tiny (and 
insignificant) 7.34 basis points per year more than the firms that adhere to the norm.   
Based on this analysis, it appears that firms that violate the price norm do not 
generate any economically or statistically significantly different returns over the next 
year. This suggests that the failure to split is not punished in any way, and that the 
aggregate effects of adhering to the norm compared to violating the norm are not 
material. (Warren Buffett can relax—he has been right all along.)  This is further 
evidence that the mechanism that generates the price stationarity is norms, and not 
some economic rationale. It also suggests that while firms may try to cater to investor 
preferences via price targeting actions as suggested by Greenwood et al, 2008, the 
gains from catering are short lived and reversed over time. 
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Conclusion  
U.S. share prices have remained constant at around $30 in nominal terms since 
the Great Depression, while the general price level in the U.S. economy have risen 
more than tenfold. These constant share prices are not a coincidence, but rather result 
from a pro-active effort of firms splitting their stock. This pattern cannot be explained 
by the standard explanations for stock splits, such as marketability and investor 
budget constraints, by “pay to play” considerations such as bid-ask spread and 
brokerage commissions, nor by signaling. The average price choice of firms and 
mutual funds in the United States has remained stable in the face of changing tic size, 
investor composition, trading costs, inflation, real wealth, and market returns. I 
conclude that the constant nominal share prices are a puzzle when viewed through the 
conventional lenses.  
In my view, firms are following norms when they determine their “optimal” 
trading range. Specifically, keeping share prices in the same range for 70 years is the 
result of firms following traditions and norms that have evolved over time. Why have 
prices in the US remained at $30 for so long? I respond in the same manner as Tevya, 
the central character in Fiddler on the Roof. When asked why things were done as they 
had always been done, he replied that he had a simple explanation: “And what is that 
you may ask? I can tell you that in one word. `Tradition!’” 
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Tradition may also explain other aspects of corporate behavior (Akerlof (2007), 
Cronqvist et al. (2006), Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2006)). For example: Why 
do some firms have almost no debt? When and why do firms initiate dividend 
payments (which are also irrelevant in a Miller and Modigliani (1961) world)? Why are 
some firms sensitive to cash flows while others are not? (Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 
2000)) Why do spin-offs behave like their parents? (Cronqvist et al (2006)).  
I have illustrated some of the empirical regularities that make constant nominal 
prices a puzzle, but I think that the role of norms has been under-appreciated in the 
literature in general. Why do bonds have a face value of $1,000? Why have the 
regulations surrounding “accredited investor” status remained constant for so many 
years? While some of these examples are relatively trivial, others may provide more 
substantial insights into the capital markets. Norms provide a parsimonious 
explanation for all these phenomena: This is the way things have always been done.  
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